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1Abstract
We model the individuals’ investment in physical capital and education
decisions in presence of borrowing constraints and a progressive taxation sys-
tem. Our empirical evidence for 15 OECD countries supports the theoretical
model predictions according to which the eﬀe c t so ng r o w t ho fh i g h e rr e d i s -
tribution are ambiguous. We ﬁnd that in those countries characterized by a
high (low) taxation level and a high (low) degree of tax progressivity, further
redistribution has a negative (positive) impact on growth since the disincen-
tive eﬀects on individuals’ eﬀort prevail (is dominated by) the positive eﬀect
of allowing more people to have access to the capital market.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The political agenda of the developed countries’ governments can be
regarded as a recognition of one main economic concern: boosting the
economy’s growth rate without determining a socially unacceptable level
of income-wealth inequality. With the so called “skilled-biased techno-
logical change” and the consequent increase in wage (income) inequality,
governments in charge pay more attention to the growth eﬀect of redis-
tributive policy.
There is no broad consensus neither on the analysis of the relationship
between inequality and growth nor on the relationship between redistri-
bution and growth. Though, this paper will focus on this latter issue, it
is useful to have a look at the former.
The literature in this area can be divided in two categories. First, the
conventional textbook view suggests that equality has a negative impact
on growth. According to this literature, a more unequal distribution of
income is good for incentives and therefore growth-enhancing. Further-
more, under the assumption of a rising in income marginal propensity
to save, savings, and possibly growth, are positively related to wealth
inequality. (See for example, Bourguignon [1981]).
Second, a new challenging literature supports the view that equality
may aﬀect growth positively. As illustrated by Perotti [1996], it is pos-
sible to identify four mechanisms according to which this latter result
may occur. The ﬁrst, deﬁned as the “Fiscal Policy” approach emphasizes
that more equal societies require less redistribution. Since redistributive
government expenditures as well as distortionary taxation reduce the
economy’s rate of growth, more equal economies grow faster. (See, for
instance, Alesina and Rodrick [1994] and Persson and Tabellini [1994]).
Notice that under this view, equality is positively related to growth but
in general a higher redistribution leads to a lower growth rate.
The second, known as the “Sociopolitical Instability” approach, posits
a positive relationships between equality and growth given that eco-
nomic growth increases if the sociopolitical instability is reduced and
m o r ee q u a ls o c i e t i e sa r em o r ep o l i t i c a l l ys t a b l e .( S e ea m o n gt h eo t h e r s
2Benhabib and Rustichini [1996]).
The third, called by Perotti [1996] the “Endogenous Fertility” ap-
proach implies that fertility decreases as the income dispersion is re-
duced and the economy grow faster as fertility decreases. (See Barro
and Becker [1989], Becker, Murphy and Tamura [1990]).
The forth, the “Borrowing constraints-investment in education and
physical capital” approach is related to the trickle-down eﬀects of growth.
Galor and Zeira [1993] show that when individuals cannot borrow freely,
redistribution from the more to the less wealthy allows more individu-
als to invest in human capital leading to a higher growth rate. Aghion
and Bolton [1997] develops a growth model where, in presence of capital
market imperfections, redistribution fosters the trickle-down process and
therefore growth by bringing about greater equality opportunities.
Benabou [2002] presents a dynamic heterogenous agent model with
endogenous eﬀort and missing credit and insurance markets. He evalu-
ates the costs and beneﬁts of redistributive policies deﬁned as progressive
income taxes or progressive education ﬁnance. The costs of these poli-
cies derive from the distortions in agents’ labor supply and/or savings
decisions. Consumptions taxes and investment subsidies are introduced
to correct for the distortions in the savings decisions and therefore sav-
ings are restored to their optimal level. The beneﬁts of these policies are
expressed in terms of higher insurance against the risk of negative shocks
and lower credit constraints which do not allow certain investment. He
shows that in order to achieve a higher growth rate, an education ﬁ-
nance redistributive policy always dominates income tax progressivity
and transfers. This is due to the fact that the former policy implies
smaller distortions to agents’ eﬀort. The opposite holds from an insur-
ance point of view.
In the current paper, we add to the “borrowing constraints-investment”
approach a feature of the Fiscal Policy approach, a distortionary taxation
system and show how it aﬀects the relationship between redistribution
and growth3.B r i e ﬂy put, we measure redistribution as a rise in the
3Notice that we focus on the economic mechanism of the ﬁscal policy approach
(i.e. distortionary taxation disincentives human capital accumulation) and we do not
3progressivity of the taxation system.
Starting from the Aghion and Bolton [1997] framework we model,
as Galor and Zeira [1993], both the investment in physical capital and
education decisions which depends on the wealth distribution and the
opportunities to access to the capital market. In contrast to these au-
thors, the presence of a distortionary taxation system introduces a con-
ﬂicting eﬀect according to which the growth eﬀect of a redistributive
policy ﬁnanced by an increase in tax progressivity is ambiguous. The
same result can be found in Benabou [1996] where greater redistribution
leads to two conﬂicting eﬀects: on the one hand, it disincentives the in-
dividuals’ investment rate; on the other it relaxes the credit constraints
faced by the poor and given the assumption of decreasing returns to
investments allows the less wealthy to earn a higher return. According
to the Author, the growth maximizing tax rate depends on the degree
of pretax inequality. In contrast to Benabou [1996], we do not impose
the assumption of decreasing returns. This allows our framework to
generate ambiguous eﬀects on growth of higher redistribution, proxied
by changes in labor tax progressivity, even in absence of ﬁxed cost in
investments. A higher labor tax progressivity implied by a rise in the
marginal tax rates in the skilled worker (middle class) income bracket
disincentives individual’s eﬀort and requires a higher wage in order to
guarantee the same investment in education. Then if wages increases
eﬀort increases as well. In presence of increasing returns to scale, this
leads to an increase of the level of the employment per unit of eﬀort and
then to higher growth. The nonconvexity generated by the assumption
of ﬁxed costs in investments ampliﬁes this ambiguity.
As suggested by Perotti [1996], empirical evidence lags behind the
theoretical literature on income distribution and economic growth. In-
deed, empirical support on the eﬀects of redistribution on growth is
mixed. For instance, Alesina e Rodrick [1994] and Persson and Tabellini
[1994] ﬁnd that redistribution aﬀects growth negatively whereas em-
pirical analyses presented by Easterly and Rebelo [1993] and Perotti
take directly into account the political mechanism (i.e. an endogenous ﬁscal policy
reﬂects the preferences of the majority)
4[1994] support the opposite view. In particular, Perotti [1996] ﬁnds
empirical support for the “Sociopolitical Instability” and “Endogenous
Fertility”types of explanations whereas weak evidence corroborates the
“Borrowing constraints-investment in education and physical capital”.
Moreover, the data appear to sustain less the endogenous ﬁscal policy
mechanism.
However, perhaps, one of the main reason for this lack of empir-
ical support is the limitations of existing panel data on the income
(re)distribution.
We, then, also conduct an empirical analysis of the relationships
between redistribution and growth by using an original data set on
marginal and average tax rates in 15 OECD4 countries for the period
1974-1997. We impose the identifying assumption that the sign of the
growth eﬀect depends on the taxation level and the degree of tax progres-
sivity of the economy. To preview our results, we ﬁnd statistical support
to these imposed restrictions. Redistribution has a positive (negative)
eﬀect on growth in those countries characterized by a low (high) degree
of tax progressivity and a low (high) taxation level.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and
its implications. Section 3 introduces the empirical analysis and presents
the data. The empirical results are discussed in Section 4. Conclusions
follow.
2 The Model
Consider a closed economy characterized by two periods overlapping
generations and composed of three main economic groups: the very
rich (employers), the middle class (skilled-employed), the very poor
(unskilled-employed in the backyard activity)5. Following Aghion and
4For this reason, the ﬁscal policy approach to which we refer, takes into account of
the political mechanism only indirectly. If one is interested in evaluating the political
mechanism should consider a broader set of countries. It is reasonable to expect that
the political mechanism is stronger in democracies and therefore the relation between
income distribution and economic growth could be upward biased in our sample of
15 OECD countries.
5B a s i cr e s u l t sa r en o ta ﬀected by this strict classiﬁcation which is made for sake
of simplicitly.
5Bolton (1997), AB henceforth, at the beginning of the ﬁrst period indi-
viduals choose whether to invest in physical or human capital and work.
In the second period they simply allocate their net wealth between con-
sumption and bequest. The utility function depends on consumption,
bequest and eﬀort cost and takes the following form:
U =m i n{(1 − δ)ci;δbi} − h(ei) (1)
where i = e(employer),se(skilled − employed),ue(unskilled − employed);
ci and bi denote consumption and bequests respectively, the term h(ei)
represents the eﬀort cost function. Finally δ is a parameter that measures
the marginal utility of consumption. Equation 1 describes Leontieﬀ pref-
erences and we further assume, as AB, that preferences are warm glow
over bequests. This implies that optimal bequests are a linear function













Yi,u−T(yi,u,Z) if successful employer
wi,m−T(wi,m,Z) if skilled employed (3)
ω
i = {
p if unskilled employed
0 otherwise (4)
where u and m stand for upper and middle class.
The expression T(·,Z) deﬁnes a progressive taxation system which
takes into account of any non-linearities within the system. Notice that
the reason for considering a progressive taxation system is twofold. First,
it can easily be conceived as a measure of redistribution. Second, since
the taxation system is non-linear, this assumption introduces some dis-
tortions in the individuals’ investment decisions even though preferences
are warm glow over bequest6.
Then, the individual initial wealth can be used to invest either in an
entrepreneurial activity or in education or in an economy-wide mutual
6Indeed, the warm glow assumption does not alter the basic result of AB even
in presence of a proportional taxation system. See note 21 in AB paper for further
details.
6fund whose equilibrium unit (gross) return corresponds to the parameter
A.
A c c o r d i n gt oo u rs i m p l ec l a s s i ﬁcation, the poor have such a small ini-
tial endowment that they choose to work in a backyard activity which
requires no education investment. The return of this activity is deter-
ministic and quite small, (p>0). We can interpret this return either in
terms of a competitive wage in a low-productivity sector or in terms of
unemployment beneﬁts. Further, following AB, they lend their initial
endowment to an economy-wide mutual fund.
The rich are those people who have funds enough to invest in a
entrepreneurial activity and in the projects of other agents via the capital
market7. This entrepreneurial activity requires a set up cost (ϕA) and
the agent’s unit of labor. The return of this activity in post-tax terms








Y i,u−T(yi,u,Z) with probability ei,u
0 with probability (1−ei,u) (5)
That is, in case of a successful entrepreneurial project, the return,
or in other words the proﬁts of the ﬁrm, are positive and corresponds
to the total revenues. This implies that under such circumstances total
costs (initial set up costs plus all variable costs) equalize the return on
the initial endowment. In contrast, the unsuccessful outcome is equal to
zero since total costs are now just covered by the return on the initial
endowment and total revenues. The probability of success depends on
the amount of eﬀort supplied by both the employer (ei,u) and the em-
ployee (ei,m) since as, it will be shown later, total revenues are functions
of the employee’s eﬀort.
Finally, the middle class may invest in education by complementing
their initial endowment with a loan [ψA − ωi0 − T (ωi0,Z)] to cover the
ﬁxed initial cost (ψA) 8. In post-tax terms, the initial endowment is
equal to the post tax bequest:
7They could also invest in education in order to become a skilled employeed or
they simply could choose the backyard activity.
8F o rs a k eo fr e a l i s mw ea s s u m eϕ > ψ in such a way to exclude the possibility
that some middle-class individuals invest in a enterprenurial activity rather than in
education. However, basic results are not alter if we relax this assumption.
7ωi0 − T (ωi0,Z)=bi0 − T (bi0,Z) (6)
where bi0 = Aεi and εi is a random variable, εi ∼ (0,σ²).








wi−T(wi,ei,m,Z)−r(ψA−(bi0−T(bi0,Z))) with probability ei,m
0 with probability (1−ei,m)
(7)
where w denotes the wage. The unsuccessful outcome is equal to zero
since the returns in the backward activity just equalizes the repayment
of the loan.
2.1 Capital Market Equilibrium
As in AB, the equilibrium condition in the capital market requires that
the aggregate demand for funds emanating from the middle class equal-
izes the aggregate supply from the very rich and the very poor. Then,
the optimal lending contract is such that the repayment schedule is the
following:
R(ωi,T(ωi,Z)) = r(ψA − (bit − T (bit,Z))) (8)
The optimization problem of the middle-class borrower agent is to
choose the eﬀort which maximizes her expected post-tax revenue net of
both repayment and eﬀort costs taking as given the real interest rate r,
the unit (gross) return of the economy-wide mutual fund A, the initial
endowment bi0 and the wage wi.
max
e [emwi − T (wi,e i,m,Z) − ei,mr(ψA − (bi,0 − T (bi,0,z))) − h(ei,m)]
(9)







Notice that the taxation function T (wi,e i,m,Z) depends on the in-
dividual’s eﬀort. In fact, the individual’s eﬀort determines to which tax
bracket the agent’s income belongs.
















bi0 = λb or
T(Aεi,Z)
Aεi = λεi and the sub-
scripts w and b refer to the successful middle class agent wage’s and
bequest’s income brackets respectively.
As in AB, when the interest is ﬁxed and independent from the in-
dividual’s wealth, for a given tax structure, for a given degree of tax
progressivity, captured by the level of the marginal tax rate faced by




the lower the initial wealth bi0, the higher the loan repayment, the lower
the marginal return from the education investment, the less the eﬀort.
Furthermore, the eﬀort supply function is increasing in the wage and de-
creasing in the marginal tax rate, τw, for a given interest rate and initial
wealth. That is, a higher marginal tax rate tax in the skilled work-
ers’ income brackets disincentives human capital accumulation. How-
ever, holding ﬁxed the degree of tax progressivity at the middle class
income’s bracket and for a given interest rate, a redistributive policy
which ﬁnances the reduction in the average tax rate in the initial en-
dowment ((1 − λb) ↑) with an increase in the average tax rate of the
upper class individuals favours the individual’s supply of eﬀort. Un-
der this assumptions, the net of payment return in education is indeed
increased.
The very wealthy do not need to borrow and their optimization’s
problem takes the following form:
max
e
[eu(Yi,u − T (euyi,u,Z)) − h(eu)] (11)
and its solution corresponds to:





we can attribute the change in tax progressivity to the marginal tax rate if the



















∂ei,uyi = τu denotes the upper class indi-
vidual’s marginal tax rate.
Notice that in contrast with AB, because of the presence of a distor-
tionary non-linear taxation system the rich do not supply the ﬁrst-best
level of eﬀort. Furthermore, the eﬀort supplied by the rich individu-
als depend on the output produced in their ﬁrms and therefore on the
employment level (N) and the employees’ eﬀort.
The equilibrium condition implies that all loans yield the same ex-
pected return, that is:
r(ωi)em(ωi)=A (13)
By considering that only middle class agents borrow, combining equa-
tions (10) and (13) we obtain:
r(ωi)
µ
wi (1 − τw)
A





As in AB the above equation (14) shows that even when the interest
rate is endogenous, the eﬀort supply function is increasing in wealth.
2.2 Labour Market Static Equilibrium
We concentrate on the labour market of the skilled workers. Indeed,
for sake of simplicity, we can interpret the backyard activity as a self-
employed activity (e.g. agricultural sector) or as unemployment.
The very healthy with a successful entrepreneurial activity constitute
the ﬁxed number of identical competitive ﬁrms, indexed by j.T h e i r










We do not impose any restriction on the parameter α. Therefore,
the model is general enough to allow for diminishing, constant or even
increasing returns to scale.
10Since only middle class agents that have invested in education access
to this sector, we then omit the index m.
The optimization problem of the ﬁrm is to maximize her proﬁt func-
tion with respect to wages and employment for a given eﬀort supplied by
the workers. This problem is solved in two stages: ﬁrst, the ﬁrm chooses














From this cost minimization we obtain the well-known Solow condi-






The individual’s eﬀort supplied to achieve an educational degree cor-
responds to the eﬀort supplied as employed.





Pre tax wages of successful skilled workers deﬁned by equation (18)
is an increasing function of the technological parameter A a n do ft h ei n -
dividual’s eﬀort supplied. A rise in the marginal tax rates disincentives
human capital accumulation, therefore an increase in wages is required
to compensate for higher levels of marginal tax rates (higher tax pro-
gressivity) .
Second, given wages and eﬀort, the ﬁrm chooses the employment level
to maximize proﬁt. Suppose further that once educated, the eﬀort pro-
vided by the successful skilled worker is homogeneous. The employment











If αβ < 1 (i.e. if there are decreasing or constant return to scale) the
employment level of the successful skilled workers, deﬁned by equation
11(19), is a decreasing function of wages and increasing in individual’s
eﬀort. Substituting equation (18) into (19) we ﬁnally have:






Therefore, according to equation (20), the employment level is a
decreasing function of the eﬀort supplied by the middle class agents as
long as either αβ < 1 and α(1 − β)−1 < 0 or αβ > 1 and α(1 − β)−1 >
0.
Finally substituting equation (20) into (15) we obtain:






Since ﬁrms are identical, if the eﬀort supplied by the successful skilled
workers is homogeneous, we have a symmetric equilibrium, according to
which the ﬁrm speciﬁc wage, labour demand and output are equal to the
aggregate ones. Under this hypothesis we can omit the subscript “j”.
Notice that this symmetric equilibrium can be easily conceived as equal
to the within generation equilibrium. In contrast if we allow for het-
erogeneity in individuals’ eﬀort which depends on the initial wealth (i.e.
individual’s eﬀort supplied to achieve an educational degree corresponds
































Equations (22) can be instead thought as a steady state intergen-
erational equilibrium where the initial functional distribution of wealth
12matters. How this latter matters depends on the technological parame-
ters. A similar result can be found in Benabou [1996] where the negative
relationship between pretax inequality and output builds on the assump-
tion of decreasing return to scale.
2.3 Analysis
We now proceed with some comparative statics. We start, for sake of
simplicity, with the assumption of homogeneous eﬀort supplied. Indeed,
as it is clear from equations (22) the technological parameters play a
crucial role under both the assumption of homogeneous and heteroge-
neous individuals’ eﬀort in determining the eﬀects on employment, out-
p u ta n dg r o w t ho fa ni n c r e a s ei nt h em a r g i n a lt a xr a t eo ft h es u c c e s s f u l
skilled worker income bracket. Notice further that we can interpret this
symmetric equilibrium also in terms of a steady state intergenerational
equilibrium in absence of ﬁxed costs in investment of education.
Remark 1 An increase in tax progressivity obtained through a higher
marginal tax rate in the middle class tax bracket holding constant all
the other tax parameters has a positive eﬀe c to ne m p l o y m e n ta n do u t p u t
either if 1 − αβ > 0 and β > 1 or 1 − αβ < 0 and β < 1.
Proof.
∂N
∂ (1 − τw)










∂ (1 − τw)






1−αβ α(1 − β)
1 − αβ
(25)
Given, our model speciﬁcation 1 > β > 0, an increase in tax pro-
gressivity, measured as an increase of the marginal tax rate holding all
the other tax parameters constant, leads to higher employment only if
the labour demand is upward sloping (αβ > 1).A ni n c r e a s ei nt a xp r o -
gressivity requires a higher wage in order to compensate the disincentive
eﬀect of providing less eﬀort. Therefore, the rise in the wage leads to
higher eﬀort and then to higher output. If return to scale are increasing,
13this increase of the production has a positive eﬀect on the employment.
In contrast if the labour demand is downward sloping (i.e. return to
scale are decreasing), the increase in the wage implies lower employment
and therefore a output reduction.
Depending on the parameters’ value are also the eﬀects on employ-
ment and output of a reduction in the average tax rate of the bequest
which is compensated by an increase of the average tax rate in the in-
come bracket faced by the upper class agents10. Indeed, considering a
simultaneous increase in λu =
T(ei,uyi,u,Z)
yi,u and a reduction in λb :
∂N
∂ (1 − λb)
=







According to equation (25) we observe a greater opportunities eﬀect
when either αβ − 1 < 0 and α(1 − β) − 1 < 0 or αβ − 1 > 0 and
α(1 − β) − 1 > 0. For greater opportunities eﬀect we mean that higher
redistribution allows more individuals to access the credit market (since
the net of taxes loan repayment is smaller) and thus enhances production
and employment. Notice that the above conditions correspond to those
required for an employment level as a decreasing function of the eﬀort
supplied by the middle class agents. Consider for example the case of
decreasing returns to scale (αβ − 1 < 0;α(1 − β) − 1 < 0).T h i si se x -
actly the result obtained by Benabou [1996]. Allowing more individuals
to invest in education brings them to earn a higher return.
2.4 The Economy growth rate
Let’s still consider the assumption of homogeneous eﬀort supplied.
T h ew i t h i ng e n e r a t i o ng r o w t hr a t eo rt h eg r o w t hr a t eo ft h ee c o n o m y











where n = N
e deﬁnes the employment per unit of eﬀort; sh is the
fraction of output devoted to investment in education; m is the fraction
10Of course, this comparative statics exercise is relevant only in presence of ﬁxed
costs in investment in education.
14of output devoted to the accumulation of eﬀort and gA =
d(At+1−At)
At
ﬁnally stands for the rate of growth of the technological change.
Then, the output growth rate depends on the variations of the em-
ployment per unit of eﬀort of the successful middle class skilled workers.
According to equation (27), we can describe the growth eﬀects of a
redistributive policy measured as an increase in tax progressivity.
Remark 2 The growth eﬀect of a rise in the marginal tax rate in the
successful skilled worker income bracket depends on how the change in


























< 0 if n>1 given that 0 <m<1 and 0 <s h < 1
∂n
∂ (1 − τw)






















< 0 and ∂n
∂(1−τw) > 0
∂g


















































< 0 and ∂n
∂(1−λb) > 0
∂g




< 0 and ∂n
∂(1−λb) < 0
15Let’s consider the case where the labour demand is upward sloping
1 − αβ < 0. A rise in the marginal tax rates in the successful skilled
worker income bracket disincentives individual’s eﬀort and requires a
higher wage in order to guarantee the same investment in education.
Then if wages increases eﬀort increases as well. If 1 − αβ < 0, the
increase in eﬀort determines higher output and employment as shown
in Remark 1. Under these assumptions, if the parameter α is bigger
than 1 (i.e. if we have increasing returns to scale), then a rise in tax
progressivity increases the level of employment per unit of eﬀort and
therefore leads to higher growth.
According to equation (30),f o rag i v e nτw, if we allow for a reduction
in the initial endowment average tax rate ﬁnanced by an increase in
average tax rate in the upper class income bracket, the eﬀect on the
growth rate of the economy is still ambiguous.
So far, we have treated sh and m as constant. Results are even more
ambiguous if we assume that sh and m are a function of the taxation
level and the degree of tax progressivity11. Under these latter assump-
tions we could conceive the sign of the growth eﬀect of a redistributive
policy as an increasing in tax progressivity depending not only on the
technology parameters but also on the taxation level and the degree of
tax progressivity.
Finally, when we relax the assumption of homogenous individuals’
eﬀort supplied the eﬀects on growth of changing the marginal tax pa-
rameters are still ambiguous. See the Appendix for further details.
3 The Empirical Model
Equation (26) solves the growth rate of the economy as
g = G(ln∆e,ln(∆T(·,Z),)) (32)
11The eﬀect of a tax progressivity change on the economic growth




















where it is reasonable to expect
³
∂sh
∂(1−τw) > 0; ∂m
∂(1−τw) > 0
´
, that is the fraction of output dedicated to investment
in education (the accumulation of eﬀort) decreases as long as the marginal tax rate
in the skilled workers income bracket increases.
16Notice that the growth rate depends on the growth rate of the eﬀort
provided and the entire tax structure. Aghion and Bolton (1997) show
that following a redistributive tax-subsidy scheme eﬀort is either increas-
ing or constant leading to an unambiguous positive eﬀect on output and
growth. Considering a progressive taxation system, our model suggests
that this eﬀect may be ambiguous. Since an increase (reduction) in the
marginal (average) tax rates implies higher progressivity, we identify the
marginal and average tax changes as a measure of redistribution.
With these additional assumptions, a simpliﬁed log-linear approxi-
mation of the growth equation yields the following empirical models:
gjt = fj + β1j∆τjt + β2j∆λjt + β3jgj(t−k) + ²jt (32a)
gjt = fj + β1j∆τjt + β2j∆λjt + β3jgj(t−k) + β4j lnyj,t−1 + ujt (32b)
where henceforth the index j is country speciﬁc instead of ﬁrm speciﬁc;
gjt is per capita output growth (expressed as ln∆yjt), ∆τjt denotes the
change in the marginal income tax rate, ∆λjt is the average income tax
rate of change and fj is a country speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect and ²jt and ujt
are the random error terms (²jt and ujt ∼ i.i.d). The term gj(t−k) is
introduced to correct for any kind of dynamic misspeciﬁcation and the
term lnyj,t−1 in the 32b speciﬁcation to capture the speed of convergence
towards the steady state12.N o t i c et h a t32a can refer to an endogenous
growth model where there is not transitional dynamics. In contrast, 32b
allows for a transitional dynamics although so far we do not introduce
explicitly the long run equilibrium term. This made is for a comparison
with many other empirical studies on the growth equation. Finally,
we consider a third model speciﬁcation according to which the long run
equilibrium relates output to the two tax levels of interest and a measure
of the stock of human capital such as the average years of education
(hc)13.T h a ti s :
12As it is well known, the estimated coeﬃcient on lnyt−1 suﬀers from a downward
bias of 1/T as proved by Nickell [1981]. However, in our case, this bias is not so
severe as in a dynamic panel where N is large and T relatively small.
13This variable is taken from page 28 of the OECD working paper n.282/2001 by
Andrea Bassanini and Stefano Scarpetta.
17gjt = fj+β1j∆τjt+β2j∆λjt+β3jgj(t−k)−φj (lnyj − θ1jτj − θ2jλj − θ3jhcj)t−1+εjt
(32c)
Equation can be conceived as a simpliﬁed ECM model speciﬁcation.
Notice further that the hypothesis of homogenous long-run parameters
is speciﬁcally tested. As long as it is accepted we will adopt a Pooled
Mean Group procedure as suggested by Pesaran, Shin and Smith [1999].
The model is estimated on a sample of 15 OECD countries observed
from 1974 to 1997. According to our model the link among wealth
inequality, borrowing constraints and growth is the pressure for redistri-
bution that arises. Social security and welfare, health and housing and
public expenditure on education represent types of government expen-
ditures which are redistributive in nature. However, as suggested by our
theoretical model, what matters for growth is the distortionary eﬀect of
taxation. For this reason, following explicitly our model we introduce
the rate of change of marginal and average personal income tax rates.
Previous empirical work, most notably by Eastearly and Rebelo [1993]
and by Perotti [1996], have added marginal tax rates as income distri-
bution variables to the set of independent variables of standard growth
regressions.
This empirical analysis diﬀers from them by using an original data set
and by exploiting both the time and the cross-sectional variation. Fol-
lowing Perotti [1996], the identifying assumption of the structural form
are the exclusion of an “equality measure” from the above model speciﬁ-
cation (the economic mechanism) and the exclusion at least in the short
run in what Perotti [1996] calls the political mechanism of both a human
capital measure and the unemployment rate.
In the current setup, on the one side, progressive taxation and high
tax rates disincentive investment in human capital and eﬀort. Then
growth might increase as distortionary taxation decreases. On the other,
progressive taxation could incentive eﬀort through a rise in the wage,
leading thus to a higher growth rate. Then, it is reasonable to expect
t h en e g a t i v e( p o s i t i v e )e ﬀect to dominate in those countries character-
ized by high marginal (average) tax rate and a high (low) degree of tax
18progressivity. Expectations on countries characterized by a mixed com-
bination of high marginal (average) tax levels and low (high) degree of
tax progressivity are not signed. For this reason, in the empirical speciﬁ-
cation we will also test the restrictions that the sign of the eﬀect depends
on the taxation level and the degree of tax progressivity according to the
following scheme:




















On the horizontal axis countries are ordered according to their aver-
age over the sample period degree of tax progressivity from the lowest
(i.e. the highest value for the coeﬃcient of income progression ) to the
highest whereas on the vertical axis they are ranked on the basis of their
average level of marginal personal income tax rates from the lowest to
the highest.
If the relation of interest is hump-shaped, we expect a positive (neg-
ative) eﬀect of redistribution on growth for those countries in the ﬁrst
(fourth) quadrangle. That is, countries with low (high) tax rates and
19low (high) tax progressivity might beneﬁt (be penalized by) of more re-
distribution measured as a rise in the marginal tax rate. Countries in
the second and third ones are not signed on a priori grounds.
A similar identiﬁcation scheme relates the degree of tax progressivity
and the level of the average personal income tax rate14.
On the horizontal axis, as before, countries are ordered according to
their degree of tax progressivity, averaged over the sample period, from
the lowest to the highest whereas now on the vertical axis they are ranked
on the basis of their average personal income tax rates averaged over the
sample period from the highest to the lowest. We expect a negative
(positive) eﬀe c to fr e d i s t r i b u t i o no ng r o w t hf o rt h o s ec o u n t r i e si nt h e
ﬁrst15 (fourth16) quadrangle. That is, countries with high (low) average
tax rates and low (high) tax progressivity might beneﬁt (be penalized
by) of more redistribution measured as a reduction in the average tax
rate. As in the previous ﬁgure, countries in the second and third ones
are not signed on a priori grounds.
When these restrictions hold, we say that the sign of the eﬀect of
redistribution on growth depends on the degree of tax progressivity and
the tax rates levels. In the next sections we will then test whether these
restriction hold.
3.1 The Data
We investigate the relationship between redistribution and growth using
an original data set on marginal and personal income taxes: a panel for
15 OECD countries (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden,
UK, US) covering the period 1974-1997.
The main source which has allowed the creation of this data set is
an OECD publication “The tax-beneﬁt position of production workers.”
For each year and for each country in the sample, we compute pretax
14Although, a pure increase in tax progressivity is determined by a rise in the
marginal tax rate holding constant the average tax rate, if the policy maker lowers,
ceteris paribus, the average tax rate we observe a higher progressivity in the taxation
system.
15Namely: Germany, Norway and Denmark
16Namely: Belgium, Canada and France
20wages by using the information on income tax rates, tax allowances and
credits from the relevant tax legislation and using information on the
composition of our “representative” household (a worker, earning the
average wage in the manufacturing sector, who has a dependent spouse
and two children).
Given pretax wages and social security contributions paid by the
e m p l o y e e ,w ec o m p u t et h er e l e v a n ta v e r a g ea n dm a r g i n a lt a xr a t e .T h e s e
rates are based on labor income only, and do not take into account
additional income from capital and self - employment. The Appendix at
the end of the paper provides additional technical details.
Data refer to the income distribution rather than the wealth distribu-
tion object of our structural approach. However, one can argue that this
ﬁrst approximation can be accepted given the large correlation between
indicators of equality derived from the two distribution.
Figure 2 provides a summary description of the data by group clas-
siﬁed on the basis of their level of the marginal tax rate17.
The ﬁrst group (GR1) (high marginal tax rate countries whose re-
distributive eﬀect might be negative) includes all countries in the fourth
quadrangle of Figure 118; the second (GR2) (low marginal tax rate coun-
tries whose redistributive eﬀects might be positive) all those belonging
to the ﬁrst one19 and the third group incorporates all those countries
whose redistributive eﬀects are not signed on a priori grounds20.
The ﬁrst panel of the ﬁgure shows that the GDP per capita growth
has ﬂuctuated during the sample period, among all the three groups
of countries. Per capita growth rate (AV GR) averaged over the 15
countries is also included. The three groups seem to present a similar
evolution of the GDP per capita growth rate at the beginning of the
sample period whereas they seem to respond diﬀerently to shocks. In
particular, the second group appears to be less responsive. Marginal
tax rates by countries’ groups have increased (see panel 2), especially
17We cluster the countries on the basis of two criterion combining alternatively the
degree of tax progressivity either to the marginal or to the average tax rates.
18Namely: Belgium, Finland, The Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US.
19N a m e l y :A u s t r a l i a ,G e r m a n y ,I t a l y ,J a p a n ,N o r w a ya n dS p a i n .
20Namely: Canada, Denmark and France.
21among the third group. As a consequence, the relative marginal tax
r a t eb e t w e e nt h et h i r da n dt h eﬁrst group has lowered from less than 7%
in 1974 to about 5% in 1997. The absolute gap between the ﬁrst and






















































































































































































Panel 3 shows that ﬁrst and second group average income tax has
increased up to mid eighties, bounced back to increase again at the
beginning of the nineties. Finally, the evolution of tax progressivity,
measured by the coeﬃcient of residual income progression, is illustrated
in the last panel of the ﬁgure. For the ﬁrst and second group, progres-
sivity increased sharply up to 198321, partially bounced back in the mid
1980 to decrease in the rest of the period. For the third group, it has
decreased sharply up to 1982 and increased thereafter.
For space constraint, we do not report a similar ﬁgure presenting
evidence by clustering countries according to the combined level of tax
progressivity and the average personal income tax rate.
21Remind that progressivity increases when the coeﬃcient of residual income pro-
gression decreases.
224R e s u l t s
We start our empirical analysis by estimating 32a,b,c on the longitudinal
data for the years 1974-1997. Since individual ﬁxed eﬀects are eliminated
by taking ﬁrst diﬀerences; the term fj captures time ﬁxed eﬀects in levels.
First, we test the hypothesis of homogenous coeﬃcients, second, if we
r e j e c tt h ea b o v eh y p o t h e s i s ,w ea s s u m ear a n d o mc o e ﬃcient model:
βjx = βx + ξjx
that is, individual coeﬃcient are distributed around a common mean
and the disturbance component ξjx has a zero mean and a constant
variance.
Providing a statical support to the heterogeneity of the parameters is
important for at least two main reasons. First, our theoretical framework
suggests that coeﬃcients which measures the growth eﬀect of redistribu-
tion might diﬀer across countries according to their taxation level and
the degree of tax progressivity. Second, Pesaran and Smith [1995] show
that in a dynamic setting the pooled estimator is inconsistent when the
coeﬃcients’ heterogeneity is ignored even if the time dimension goes to
inﬁnity.
Poolability is tested by the method proposed by Lee, Pesaran and














where t stands for number of temporal observations and k denotes the
number of regressors. For (k ≤ x) under the null hypothesis of parameter
homogeneity, we have:
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subscript a stands for “aggregate” (i.e. parameter homogeneity)
23Dependent variable: ln∆yjt




















ητ - - 1.48
ηλ - - -.817
ηhc - - .786
Nobs 315 315 315
R2 .18 .59 .66
POOL .00 .01 .00
POLR -- . 4 1
Note: Each regression includes a speciﬁc constant and two lags of the
dependent variable. Robust standard errors within parentheses. R2 adjusted
for the degree of freedom ητ : marginal income tax long run elasticity of the
per capita output; ηλ : average income tax long run elasticity of the per
capita output; ηhc : human capital long run elasticity of the per capita
output. POOL : P- value of the test for the homogeneity of parameters
(χ2 (4) = 16.87;χ2 (5) = 16.69;χ2 (5) = 34.33); POLR: P- value of the
test for the homogeneity of the long run coeﬃcients (χ2 (4) = 3.99).
Table 1: Estimates of 32a,b,c based on panel data (1974-1997)
We perform the above test since the familiar method proposed by
Zellner [1962] is too restrictive23. Since according to Lee et al. [1990],
the null could hold even when the homogeneity assumption is rejected.
A c c o r d i n gt oo u rm o d e ls p e c i ﬁcation 32c, we will test further the ho-
mogeneity restriction on the long-run parameters through an Hausman
test which as usual evaluates whether the estimated coeﬃcients using a
m e a ng r o u pp r o c e d u r ea n dap o o l e dm e a ng r o u po n ed od i ﬀer.
Our main results are reported in Table 1 which shows the estimated
coeﬃcients associated to the change in the tax variables under the ho-
23Zellner [1962] tests the homogeneity hypothesis as follows:
H0 : βj1 = βj2 = .. = βxj = ... = βxς
24mogeneity assumption. The dependent variable is the change in the
(log) GDP per capita, where the latter is obtained by dividing the an-
nual GDP at constant price by the total population. Under all model
speciﬁcations, we ﬁnd that higher redistribution induced by a positive
(negative) change in the marginal (average) taxes signiﬁcantly reduces
the per capita growth rate of the economy. It is interesting to note, that
according to Table 1, column 32a, a change in the marginal tax rate is
equivalent, in terms of the redistribution eﬀect on growth, to a change
i nt h ea v e r a g et a xr a t es i n c et h es i z eo ft h et w oc o e ﬃcients is quite sim-
ilar. Further, notice that the estimates appear to be robust to the three
model speciﬁcations.
Therefore, redistribution appears to aﬀect the OECD countries’ growth
negatively. However, the LPP criterion clearly rejects the hypothesis of
homogeneity. We then estimate a version of (32(a,b,c)) where we allow
for parameter heterogeneity under the assumption of a random coeﬃ-
cient model. We estimate two alternative empirical speciﬁcations.
In a former speciﬁcation we follow Pesaran and Smith [1997] by al-
lowing for short run coeﬃcients heterogeneity across all sectional units.
Therefore, estimates are based on what Pesaran and Smith deﬁne as
a“Mean Group Estimator”.
In the second speciﬁcation, we impose and test restrictions on param-
eter heterogeneity within three groups of countries according to our iden-
tiﬁcation scheme. The second speciﬁcation allows us to verify whether
the eﬀect of distribution on growth depends on the tax level and the
degree of tax progressivity.
Notice that when considering equation 32c, according to the Haus-
man test (reported as POLR) the homogeneity hypothesis on the long
run parameters is accepted and therefore we proceed further under this
assumption.
Table 2 shows our estimates, with the former speciﬁcation in the
ﬁrst three columns (without country groups classiﬁcation) and the lat-
ter speciﬁcation (with country groups classiﬁcation) in the last three
columns. The ﬁrst three columns show that a higher redistribution ob-
tained as positive (negative) rate of change in the marginal (average)
25income tax reduces the economy growth. These ﬁndings conﬁrm the
results in Table 1. Moreover, compared to that table, we ﬁnd that the
impact of redistribution on growth diﬀers quantitatively. The eﬀect is
stronger to that found in Table 1 for both a change in the marginal and
a change in the average personal income tax rate24.
Next we ask whether the impact of redistribution on growth vary by
tax level and the degree of tax progressivity, as suggested by our iden-
tiﬁcation scheme. This is done by selecting the empirical speciﬁcation
in the last three columns of Table 2 and by classifying the countries in
three groups according to which, given their tax levels and degree of tax
progressivity, a higher redistribution obtained as an increase (a reduc-
tion) in the marginal (average) tax rate might have a negative (GR1) 25,
positive (GR2) 26 or unsigned eﬀect (GR3) 27 on growth. Notice that, by
averaging, the mean group estimator provides a consistent estimator of
the eﬀect with respect to all the country set. Nevertheless, if the sign of
the eﬀect depends on the tax levels and the degree of tax progressivity, a
simple average could change the sign of the eﬀect for some countries and
could weaken the eﬀect. Then, we started from what suggested by our
diagrams such as Figure 1 and the ﬁnal country classiﬁcation to which
we arrived diﬀer slightly from that only on the basis of the statistical
tests. In particular we were unable to identify what we deﬁne as a second
group for a change in the average tax rate.
The last three columns in Table 3.2 broadly conﬁrm that the sign
of the redistribution eﬀect on growth depends on the tax level and the
degree of tax progressivity. All the tax change coeﬃcients appear to
be signiﬁcant28. The three groups of country present the sign expected.
24Although now, when considering equation 32a the coeﬃcient of the marginal
income tax rate is smaller and insigniﬁcant.
25Countries included in the ﬁrst group are: Finland, Netherlands, Norway, Spain,
Sweden and the UK with regard to the marginal tax rate; Finland, Italy, Spain,
Sweden and the UK with regard to the average tax rate.
26The second group, classiﬁed only with respect to the marginal tax rate is made
of: Australia, Germany, Italy and Japan.
27The third group consists of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France and the US
with regard to the marginal tax rate; Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France,
Germany, Japan, The Netherlands, Norway and the US with respect to the average
tax rate.
28Only the change in the marginal tax rate of the second group is not signiﬁcant
26Dependent variable: change in log annual GDP per capita






























































ητ - - 1.35 - - 1.38
ηλ - - -.744 - - -.763
ηhc - - .715 - - .734
Nobs 315 315 315 315 315 315
R2 .188 .654 .714 .188 .653 .708
ZEL - - - .259 .078 .065
Note: Additional regressors: speciﬁc constant and two lags of the dependent
variable. Robust standard errors within parentheses. ητ : marginal income
tax long run elasticity of the per capita output; ηλ : average income tax long
r u ne l a s t i c i t yo ft h ep e rc a p i t ao u t p u t ;ηhc : human capital long run
elasticity of the per capita output. ZEL : P- value of the test for the
identiﬁcation of the three groups of countries
χ2 (3) = 4.02;χ2 (3) = 6.28;χ2 (3) = 7.23.
Table 2: Mean Group Estimates on equations 32a,b and Pooled Mean
Group Estimates on equation 32c
27Furthermore, it is worth pointing out that the third group (i.e. the
unsigned from a theoretical point of view) suggest that diﬀerent redis-
tribution eﬀect can be obtain if one allows a change in the marginal
(negative) rather than an average (positive)29 tax rate30. Notice that, as
before, we test the country classiﬁcation by imposing the “homogeneity”
restrictions within the three groups by carrying out a Zellner [1962].
Finally, from an economic perspective, redistribution could be en-
dogenous. That is, a higher rate of growth could lead higher redistri-
bution. Notice, however, that our measure of redistribution derives by
construction from the earnings distribution and refers to a sort of rep-
resentative employee tax-payer. Therefore, it could also end up to be
exogenous. Then, the endogeneity of the current changes in the two
tax rates requires to be tested. The Hausman test clearly suggests that
changes in tax rates are not endogenous31,32.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
We have found that higher redistribution aﬀects growth conditioning on
the degree of tax progressivity and the taxation level. In those countries
characterized by a high taxation level and a high degree of tax pro-
gressivity, further redistribution has a negative impact on growth since
the disincentive eﬀects on individuals’ eﬀort prevail the positive eﬀect of
allowing more people to have access to the capital market.
This result is consistent with our theoretical framework where a
feature extrapolated from the so called “Fiscal Policy” approach, as a
distortionary taxation system, has been introduced in a growth model
closed to the borrowing -constraint investment in education and capital
market approach.
Our ﬁndings could also explain why empirical evidence on this issue
in the 32b speciﬁcation (i.e. column (2 − 32b)).
29A decrease (increase) in the average (marginal) tax rate determines higher redis-
tribution captured by a higher tax progressivity.
30This result does not hold when we introduce the long run term.
31The values of the Hausman test are the following: 0.99; 0.98 and 0.79 respectively
when we consider model speciﬁcation 32a, b and c.
32We do not report the full table of results which is available from the author upon
request.
28presents ambiguous results. A message of this paper is that the political
agenda’s dilemma could be less costly than it seems to be. In societies
characterized by a high level of income-wealth inequality, boosting the
economy’s growth and reducing the income disparities can both be ob-
tained by the same redistributive policy.
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31Appendix
5.1 Heterogenous individuals’ eﬀort supplied
Consider now the case of heterogenous agents’ eﬀort which depends on
the initial wealth distribution. Our production function now becomes:




















transforming (A.1) into logs we have:
lnyt = cons +l nA +
αβ
1 − αβ









It is clear from equation (A.3) that the eﬀects on output of an increase
in the marginal tax rate depends on the initial wealth distribution. How
the initial wealth distribution aﬀects the output depends on the tech-
nological parameters. When returns to scale are decreasing, we obtain
an ambiguous eﬀect of an increase in the marginal tax rate τw.W h e n
returns to scale are increasing but 1 < α < 2 we still have that a higher
τw ambiguously increases output.




























326 The data set
Some few assumptions regarding the identiﬁcation of a common socio-
economic group are needed in order to have a dataset which is able to
provide comparable data among countries.
Following Lockwood and Manning (1993), a married with two chil-
dren male production worker that earns the average gross wage from
employment in the manufacturing sector is believed to be a good approx-
imation of this representative agent (APW). Since the taxation system
is not linear, when aggregating across diﬀerent industries, where earn-
ings are reasonably diﬀerent, the average marginal rate and the average
rate are not, in general, equal to the marginal and average tax rates



















where now n stands for the number of individuals (i).33
However, given that the basic rate tax bracket is so large for almost
all countries and for most of the sample period this aggregation bias is
not likely to be severe.
The spouse of this representative tax-payer does not work. Although
this assumption may lack of reality, it is diﬃcult to see any other alter-
native given that the OECD data until 1995 are collected assuming this
household’s characteristic.34.
Only wage income is considered. That is, the actual tax rates may
be higher than those presented in this database. However, in the United
States only, such representative tax payer receives an unearned income
equal, on average, to the 5 % of its income. In almost all the other
countries, diﬀerent sources of income than wage are not signiﬁcant. For
example, in Australia and Finland, they account for 0.5 per cent of the
APW’s wage.
33We slightly change here notation for convenience.
34For further details about the guidelines on the methodology and limitations of
the data, see OECD ”The Tax Beneﬁt position of production workers”, Part I.







where ITL stands for Income Tax Liability, TI for Taxable Income,
SSC for Social Security Contributions and Y for Wage or Taxable In-
come according to the country legislation.
Income Tax Liability consists of the liability due to the central gov-
ernment. Yet, it takes into account state and local liabilities in those
Federal countries where income taxes are levied by intermediate levels
of government. In particular, Canada and the United States levy state
taxes, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Japan, Norway, Sweden and the
United States local taxes. For simplicity’ sake and without a big loss of
precision they are all considered as proportional to taxable income. The
latter is deﬁned as:
TI = GWE − STA + TC
The Gross Wage Earnings (GWE) corresponds to the Wage paid to
the Average Production Worker (APW) in the manufacturing sector;
the Standard Tax Allowances (STA) and Tax Credits (TC) are those
applicable to the average production worker who is married, with two
children, and satisﬁes all the requirement speciﬁed in the legislation.
Social Security Contributions are those compulsory contributions
paid by the employees at the APW income level to government or social
security funds controlled by the government. They are levied on gross
earnings for almost all countries with the exception of Denmark, Fin-
land, France, the Netherlands and Norway where they are based on the
taxable income35.




where TPG stands for Total Payment to the Government, CP for
Cash Transfer and W for Gross Wage Earnings.
35This is true for almost the entire sample period.
34Total payments to general government includes all central, state and
local income taxes ﬁnally paid and the employees’ social security contri-
butions. Cash Transfers mainly regards the ”standard tax allowances”
paid in respect of a wife and dependent children between ﬁve and twelve
years old.
A more accurate measure of the eﬀective average labour income tax
rate should include also the non standard reliefs. By ”non standard tax
reliefs” is meant all those reliefs associated to the actual expenses in-
curred. Yet, for various reasons explained by the OECD, it is possible
to have this data for very few years only. Therefore, the main concerns
are related to those countries where they have a relevant weight in de-
termining the eﬀective average tax rate. This is in particular the case
of Denmark where ignoring these reliefs is quite misleading. Indeed, the
eﬀective average tax rate for our representative agent is reduced of the
30% if the non standard tax reliefs are considered36. For this reason, the
Denmark eﬀective average tax rate series is extrapolated by the personal
income tax revenue.
The last remarks regard cross-countries and time series limitations
of the dataset.
First, from the cross-country point of view, it should be bore in mind
that even though the APW corresponds to workers who are doing the
same kind of jobs, its wage is not in the same position in the distribution
of earnings in each country.
Second, from the time series points of view the main problem relates
t ot h ef a c tt h a ti ti sl i k e l yt h a tt h ee a r n i n g sd a t ad on o tr e f e rt ot h e
same taxpayer throughout the period.
However, as pointed out by the OECD, results can be misleading
only if many of the limitations are taken cumulatively within a speciﬁc
country.
36Spain and Sweden suﬀer of the same problem. However, given the few years where
the OECD provides both measures the eﬀective average tax rate (e.g. including or
excluding the non standard tax relief ), it seems that the bias in not so relevant as
in the Denmark case.
35